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ABSTRACT 
I investigate the determinants and economic consequences associated with financial 
reporting quality.  I find evidence of a positive association between investors’ demands 
for firm-specific information and financial reporting quality.  In addition, the evidence 
suggests that higher proprietary costs (proxied by capital intensity, product market 
competition, and growth opportunities) are associated with a lower quality of financial 
information.  Controlling for the firm-specific characteristics determining financial 
reporting quality, I find evidence of a negative association between firms’ total risk and 
financial reporting quality.  Decomposing total risk into a systematic component and an 
idiosyncratic one, the results imply that firms providing financial information of higher 
quality do not necessarily enjoy a lower cost of equity capital.  However, a significant 
negative relation is documented between reporting quality and idiosyncratic risk.  This 
suggests that the quality of accounting information cannot be characterized as an 
additional systematic priced risk factor, but rather as an idiosyncratic one, once the firm-
specific characteristics determining information quality are controlled for.  These results 
demonstrate the importance of explicitly controlling for the determinants of financial 
reporting quality when investigating the associated economic consequences and question 
recent empirical evidence on the association between reporting quality and the cost of 
equity capital. 
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1. Introduction 
I investigate the determinants and economic consequences of cross-sectional variation 
concerning the quality of financial reporting.   
Whether disclosure policies and financial reporting affect a firm’s cost of equity 
capital is one of the most interesting and important questions in the accounting and 
finance literature today.  To date, there is a growing body of evidence that information 
quality and disclosure policy lowers the equity cost of capital (e.g., Botosan [1997], 
Easley and O’Hara [2004]).  However, this evidence is troubling for two reasons.  First, 
classical asset pricing theory shows that diversifiable risks are not priced, and there are a 
paucity of compelling arguments for why information risk is diversifiable (e.g. Hughes, 
Liu and Liu [2005]).  Second, most existing empirical studies take disclosure policy and 
financial reporting quality to be exogenous, although it is generally agreed that firms 
optimize their disclosure policy.   Furthermore, the specific characteristics of firms that 
provide a certain quality of financial information may also affect the consequences of 
financial reporting.  The purpose of this study is to extend prior literature by carefully 
identifying the determinants of firms’ financial reporting quality and investigating 
whether there is evidence that information risk affects the cost of equity capital once the 
firm-specific characteristics of this information risk are controlled for.   
Economic theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, increasing the quality of financial 
information reduces information asymmetries and hence lowers the cost of capital (e.g., 
Glosten and Milgrom [1985], Amihud and Mendelson [1986], Diamond and Verrecchia 
[1991], and Easley and O’Hara [2004]).  A firm can reduce information asymmetries 
between itself and market participants and between informed and uninformed investors 
by providing information that helps investors in their decision making process.  
Consistent with these theoretical models, empirical studies using indirect measures of 
disclosure document that a firm’s disclosure quality/level is positively associated with 
capital markets valuation benefits (Welker [1995], Healy et al. [1999]), and, in particular, 
is inversely related to its equity cost of capital (e.g., Botosan [1997], Botosan and 
Plumlee [2002]). Using more direct measures of accounting information quality, recent 
empirical work focuses on the association between earnings quality and the cost of 
capital (e.g., Barone [2002], Barth and Landsman [2003], Bhattacharya, Daouk and 
Welker [2003], and Francis et al. [2004, 2005]). 
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A significant shortcoming of numerous empirical disclosure studies is the failure to 
address the endogenous nature of disclosure quality.  If researchers do not control for the 
determinants of disclosure policy, their inferences regarding the economic consequences 
of disclosure quality may be spurious (Core [2001], Fields et al. [2001]).  For example, 
recent evidence by Hou and Robinson [2005] suggests that firms in industries that are 
more concentrated have lower cost of equity capital.  Theory (e.g., Verrecchia [2001]) 
and empirical evidence (e.g., Bamber and Cheon [1998], Harris [1998]) suggest that the 
level of product market competition affects disclosure policies.  Taken together with the 
recent evidence in Hou and Robinson [2005], this suggests that the level of industry 
competition is an important correlated omitted variable in any study investigating the 
association between disclosure/information quality and the cost of capital.  Such 
considerations, among other firm-specific characteristics that determine the quality of 
financial information, for example, demands for capital, litigation costs, and incentive 
costs, make it difficult to interpret the association between information risk and capital 
markets valuation benefits documented in prior research.  The research design used in 
this study specifically addresses these concerns by identifying the factors that determine 
the variation in financial reporting quality and the associated economic consequences. 
In line with recent studies on consequences of financial reporting quality (e.g., 
Francis et. al [2004, 2005]), I measure reporting quality as the mapping between earnings 
and operating cash flows (Dechow and Dichev [2002]).  These measures represent 
abnormal deviations between accounting earnings and cash flows.  Such deviations result 
in larger forecast errors on future operating cash flows which impair this mapping, 
resulting in lower quality and increasing information risk. 
I find evidence that higher investors’ demands for firm-specific information are 
associated with higher quality of financial reporting.  In addition, the results suggest that 
higher proprietary costs constrain the quality of financial information.  My findings also 
indicate that firms with high-quality financial reporting policies have lower uncertainty, 
lower idiosyncratic risk, and lower estimation risk.  However, I do not find evidence that 
firms providing high-quality financial information necessarily enjoy a lower cost of 
equity capital.  The results documented imply that although information quality is 
associated with total risk, it is the idiosyncratic diversifiable component which drives this 
relation, rather than the systematic undiversifiable component. 
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I first replicate prior findings and provide evidence consistent with the results 
documented in concurrent studies [e.g. Francis et al. [2005]).  I document that failure to 
control for firm characteristics that lead firms to have a certain quality of accounting 
information and enjoy a lower equity cost of capital may wrongly attribute the cost of 
capital benefit to information quality rather than to the underlying characteristics.  In 
other words, the evidence suggests that the link found in previous research between a 
firm’s quality of accounting information and its equity cost of capital results from a 
failure to consider the underlying factors determining the quality of financial reporting.    
My analysis implies that the information risk associated with the quality of financial 
reporting does not necessarily constitute an additional systematic non-diversifiable risk 
factor, but rather is an idiosyncratic one.  This finding suggests that capital markets 
participants are not likely to price the documented uncertainty as other risk factors, such 
as beta, size and book-to-market ratios.  This finding is consistent with recent theoretical 
work by Hughes, Liu, and Liu [2005].  Hughes et al. [2005] principal result demonstrates 
that in economies with a large number of assets, idiosyncratic risk arising from the 
quality of information is fully diversifiable and does not affect risk premiums.   
The major contribution of this study is that it accounts for the underlying firm-
specific characteristics related to the quality of their financial reporting when 
investigating the associated economic consequence.  I show that the failure to do so 
affects the inferences made and conclusions drawn by previous studies.  In addition, this 
study’s findings have important implications for research on the consequences of firms’ 
disclosure policies. The evidence I present suggests that the variation in financial 
reporting quality depends not only on the benefits firms expect to derive from disclosure, 
but also on other firm-specific attributes.  Future work on determinants and consequences 
of financial reporting policies should thus consider not only the capital market benefits 
associated with financial reporting policies, but other firm-specific characteristics, such 
as product market characteristics, which constrain the quality of reported earnings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review and presents the theoretical background on the determinants and consequences 
associated with financial reporting policies.  Section 3 describes the research design and 
addresses methodological issues.  Section 4 presents the sample selection criteria and 
discusses the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes.  
 4
2. Relation to Prior Research  
Theoretical research investigating the link between disclosure and a firm’s cost of 
capital suggests a negative association between the two.  The first stream of research 
arguing for this association concludes that firms with increased levels of disclosure 
reduce the cost of capital arising from information asymmetries, either between a firm 
and its stockholders, or between potential traders in the firm’s shares.  Examples of 
theoretical work in this area are Copeland and Galai [1983], Glosten and Milgrom 
[1985], and Diamond and Verrecchia [1991].  Diamond and Verrecchia [1991] suggest 
that higher disclosure reduces the amount of information revealed by a large trade in a 
firm’s securities, thereby reducing the negative price impact associated with such large 
trades.  In this scenario, investors would have relatively large positions in a particular 
firm’s securities.  There would be a higher demand for the firm’s securities, which would 
increase the price of the firm’s stock, thereby reducing the equity cost of capital.   
 Empirical work by Amihud and Mendelson [1986] suggests that firms whose 
stocks have a higher bid-ask spread have a higher cost of equity capital because investors 
demand compensation for the added transaction costs. The authors contend that firms that 
provide more public information can reduce the adverse selection component of the bid-
ask spread, and thus reduce their cost of equity capital.  
A second stream of research focuses on the link between estimation risk and the 
cost of capital (e.g., Barry and Brown [1985]). This research suggests that a firm can 
reduce the estimation risk associated with its payoff distribution by providing more 
disclosures. If investors price the estimation risk, providing more information will reduce 
the firm’s cost of capital.  
In recent work, Easley and O’Hara [2004] demonstrate a link between 
information structure (private versus public information) and the cost of capital.  
Developing a rational expectations asset pricing model, they argue that more private 
information increases the risk faced by uninformed investors since better informed 
investors can shift their portfolio weights to adjust for new information.  Easley and 
O’Hara [2004] imply that firms can affect their cost of capital through the precision and 
quantity of the information they provide investors.  Building on the above theory, Francis 
et al. [2004, 2005] seek to provide evidence consistent with the pricing effects of 
information quality and claim that accrual quality is a systematic priced risk factor.  The 
 5
evidence documented in Francis et al. [2004, 2005] suggests that information seems to 
affect the cost of capital.  These results are puzzling since the theoretical underpinning 
behind this finding relies on Easley and O’Hara’s [2004] model which is still a prediction 
of how information asymmetry affects the cost of capital.   Hughes et al. [2005] question 
the theoretical underpinnings of the specifications used in recent empirical studies and 
show that in large economies, idiosyncratic risk as well as the asymmetric information 
risk associated with idiosyncratic factors is fully diversifiable and should not affect the 
cost of capital in a systematic manner.  Given the two theoretical models developed in 
Easley and O’Hara [2004] and Hughes et al. [2005], an empirical question still remains as 
to whether information quality can be characterized as proxying for idiosyncratic 
components of assets payoffs which do not affect risk premiums or as a systematic 
undiversifiable factor which affects the risk premium.  It is this main empirical question 
that I seek to address in this study. 
One of the major limitations of empirical studies on corporate disclosures is the 
difficulty in measuring the quality of disclosure policies (Healy and Palepu [2001]).1 
Using the Association of Investment Management and Research (hereafter, AIMR) 
rankings as an indirect measure of disclosure quality, numerous empirical studies 
examine the association between these measures and firm characteristics and capital 
markets valuation proxies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993], Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 
[1999], and Welker [1995]). Lang and Lundholm [1993] find a positive association 
between the AIMR scores and firm size, firm performance, and security issues, and a 
negative association between the AIMR scores and the correlation between earnings and 
returns. Welker [1995] finds that firms with higher AIMR scores have lower information 
asymmetry, as proxied by bid-ask spreads. Healy, Hutton, and Palepu [1999] find that 
firms with sustained improvements in analysts’ ratings of disclosure quality (AIMR 
scores) show an increase in stock liquidity, analyst following, institutional ownership, 
and stock performance. 
Previous empirical research has documented mixed and limited evidence that 
disclosure reduces the cost of capital. Botosan [1997] finds that manufacturing firms with 
a low security analyst following have a negative association between a self-constructed 
                                                 
1 The difficulty in measuring disclosure quality has led some researchers to focus on management forecasts (e.g., Coller 
and Yohn [1997], Pownall, Wasley, and Waymire [1993]). Others examine disclosure quality ratings, for example, 
Lang and Lundholm [1996], Healy, Hutton, and Palepu [1999], and Welker [1995]. 
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index of disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. In a related empirical study 
Sengupta [1998] provides evidence that high disclosure ratings (AIMR) are inversely 
associated with the cost of debt.  Botosan and Plumlee [2002] find a negative relation 
between the annual report disclosure level (as measured by the AIMR ratings) and the 
cost of capital.  Yet they also document that the cost of capital is positively associated 
with the levels of disclosures in quarterly reports (this finding is contrary to the prediction 
of the theory).  As mentioned before, recent empirical studies (e.g., Barone [2002] and 
Francis et al. [2004, 2005], among others) document that earnings quality is associated 
with the cost of capital, suggesting that lower quality of accruals (and thus earnings) 
translates into a higher cost of capital.   
A separate but complementary branch of analytical research examines the costs, 
especially the proprietary ones, associated with disclosures.  Models such as Dye [1985b, 
1986], Verrecchia [1983, 1990], Darrough and Stoughton [1990], Wagenhofer [1990], 
and Hayes and Lundholm [1996] argue that, all things being equal, the probability of 
disclosure decreases as the associated proprietary costs increase.  Most of these 
proprietary costs borne by firms arise from interaction with other parties - the costs of 
competitive disadvantage from disclosing information to their competitors and regulators, 
of bargaining disadvantages with both suppliers and consumers, and of litigation that 
might follow informative disclosure are three such examples.2 
As Fields et al. [2001] suggest, the empirical evidence presented in studies like 
Botosan [1997] and Sengupta [1998] provides interesting insights, but these studies suffer 
from noteworthy limitations.  Most importantly, these studies do not consider the related 
costs of higher disclosure quality and whether these costs affect the disclosure decision.  
Firms measure the valuation benefits of providing higher quality earnings against the 
associated costs.  If the costs outweigh the market valuation benefits, the firm will choose 
to provide a lower quality of reported earnings, which will be less informative in 
predicting future performance.  This strongly motivates my examination of the costs and 
benefits, among other firm-specific determinants, associated with disclosure policies.  
Although Francis et al. [2004, 2005] distinguish between what they refer to as “innate” 
earnings quality and “discretionary” earnings quality, they do not address whether 
                                                 
2 Other costs related to disclosure are the costs of developing and presenting financial information.  These costs, which 
are non-proprietary, are of second-order effect.  This study focuses only on third party related costs, which are assumed 
to be proprietary. 
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proxies for proprietary costs, in particular, current product market competition, capital 
intensity, growth opportunities, and litigation costs, constrain the quality of reported 
earnings.  Given the empirical evidence in Hou and Robinson [2005], not controlling for 
the level of industry competition in examining the relation between information quality 
and the cost of capital creates an omitted correlated variables problem which introduces 
bias in the analysis.3   
Recognizing the endogenous nature of financial reporting quality policies, I first 
model the factors determining these policies.  In particular, I test whether investors’ 
demands for firm-specific information, demands for capital, litigation costs, and 
proprietary cost factors affect the variation in financial reporting quality.  As for the 
economic consequences of financial reporting quality, I test whether higher quality 
reporting is associated with various proxies for firm risk, both systematic and 
idiosyncratic. 
3. Research Design      
 Firms’ financial reporting quality policies are likely to be endogenous.  If factors 
influencing cross-sectional variation in the reporting policies also influence the 
association between the economic consequences and the quality of the reported 
accounting information, failing to control for these factors may lead to erroneous 
inferences (Maddala [1983]).  Specifically, an OLS regression of empirical measures for 
the equity cost of capital on firm characteristics and a reporting quality measure would 
result in inconsistent and biased coefficients.  To address this issue, I use a two-stage 
estimation method (Wooldridge [2002], chapter 5).  I first discuss my empirical measures 
of reporting quality and then address the factors determining financial reporting quality 
and its economic consequences. 
3.1 Measurement of Financial Reporting Quality  
In order to measure financial reporting quality I use two methods.  Across these 
methods, the focus is on the association between accruals and cash flows.  A larger 
deviation between accruals and cash flows is interpreted as lower quality of accounting 
information, reflecting higher information risk. 
                                                 
3 Hou and Robinson [2005] show that firms in more concentrated industries have a lower cost of capital.  Based on 
their findings, they infer that firms in highly concentrated industries face a lower distress risk due to the less 
competitive environment in which they are competing in.  Taken together with the empirical evidence in Harris [1998] 
that firms disclose less in more concentrated industries, one should control for the level of industry competition when 
investigating the relation between disclosure/information quality and the cost of capital. 
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The first method relies on the model presented in Barth et al. [2001].  Consider the 
following setting: (i) Firms have an objective to maximize their expected value, (ii) At 
the end of period (t-1), firms release an audited annual earnings report.  Aggregate 
earnings for period (t-1) and its components (cash flow from operations and accruals) are 
used by various parties (e.g., capital markets participants, customers, suppliers, and 
current and potential competitors) to predict firms’ future cash flows at time t, (t+1), etc. 
 Analytical models (e.g., Admati and Pleiderer [2000], Baiman and Verrecchia 
[1996], and Easley and O’Hara [2004]) take the disclosed public information’s precision 
as the measure of its quality.  The precision is interpreted as achieving a given level of 
predictability of expected future cash flows under the flexibility and discretion permitted 
by GAAP.  Thus, the higher the precision, the higher the quality of reported earnings, and 
the more accurately future cash flows may be predicted. 
To measure the level of precision empirically, I focus on the residuals obtained 
from a regression of future operating cash flows on previous period earnings components. 
The first measure of reporting quality is based on the residuals obtained from estimating 
the model specified in equation (1) using ordinary least squares: 
ε ++ +β+β+Δβ+Δβ+Δβ+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO          (1) 
Where: 
 
CFO t,i   Cash flow from operations for firm i at year t (Compustat annual data   
  item #308) minus the accrual portion of extraordinary items and  
  discontinued operations per the statement of cash flows (Compustat  
  annual data item #124); 
AR t,iΔ  Change in accounts receivable account per the statement of cash flows  
(Compustat  annual data item #302); 
INV t,iΔ  Change in inventory account per the statement of cash flow (Compustat  
  annual data item #303); 
AP t,iΔ   Change in accounts payable and accrued liabilities account per the 
statement of cash flows (Compustat annual data item #304); 
DEPR t,i  Depreciation and Amortization Expense (Compustat annual data item 
#125); 
OTHER t,i    Net of all other accruals, calculated as EARN – (CFO+ΔAR+Δ INV- 
ΔAP-DEPR), where EARN is income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (Compustat annual data item #18);4 
                                                 
4 If Compustat annual data items #302, #303, or #304 are missing, ARΔ , INVΔ , and APΔ  are calculated using data 
from the balance sheet, i.e., accounts receivable (Compustat annual data item #2), inventory (Compustat annual data 
item #3), and accounts payable (Compustat annual data item #70 plus accrued expenses (Compustat annual data item 
#153)). 
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All variables are deflated by average total assets.5 
 In order to obtain the financial reporting quality metric, I estimate equation (1) for 
each fiscal year t for each two-digit SIC industry code.  I focus on the residuals obtained 
from estimating equation (1).  These provide a firm-specific residual for each fiscal year 
t.  The first empirical measure of reporting quality is the absolute value of these residuals: 
FQ1 = |e| 1t,i + .
6  These residuals reflect the magnitude of future operating cash flows 
unrelated to current disaggregated earnings.  In the empirical analysis that follows, I 
interpret lower absolute value as representing a higher quality of financial reporting, 
which corresponds to a higher level of cash flow predictability.   The second empirical 
measure FQ2 = tie )(σ  is the standard deviation of firm i’s residuals calculated over years 
t-4 through t.  A larger standard deviation of residuals indicates a lower quality of 
reported earnings.  It should be noted that a firm which has frequently large residuals will 
have a low standard deviation implying little uncertainty about the quality of earnings.  In 
such a case, one should not expect for this to translate into any priced uncertainty.    
 To be consistent with current research, the second method of measuring reporting 
quality is based on the Dechow and Dichev [2002] method as implemented in Francis et 
al. [2005].  Under this approach, reporting quality is measured by the extent to which 
working capital accruals map into cash flow realizations.  I estimate the following 
regression for each year t for each two-digit SIC code:  
εγγγγγγ ++Δ++++=Δ +− PPEREVCFOCFOCFOWC titi tititititi ,5, ,41,3,21,10,         (2) 
Where:  
WC ti,Δ  =The change in working capital for firm i at year t which is computed as 
  the change in accounts receivable (Compustat annual data item #302) plus 
  the change in inventory (Compustat annual data item #303) less the 
  change in accounts payable (Compustat annual data item #304) less the 
  change in taxes payable (Compustat annual data item #305) plus the 
  change in other net assets (Compustat annual data item #307); 
REV ti,Δ  =The change in sales revenues (Compustat annual data item #12) between  
  year t-1 and year t; 
PPE ti,   = Gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat annual data  
  item #7) in year t; 
                                                 
5 This specification is used because it has the highest predictive ability compared to models that include multiple lags 
of cash flows from operations and accruals components (see Barth et al. [2001]). 
6 An alternative firm-year specific measure of reporting quality is the squared residual for that year.  The correlation 
between this measure and the absolute value of residuals used in the study is 0.881 (p-value< 0.0001) which suggests 
that these measures are highly correlated. The tenor of the results is very similar under this alternative specification. 
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 The model estimated in equation (2) is based on McNichols [2002] who suggests 
that adding changes in sales revenues and PPE (property plant and equipment) 
significantly increases the model’s explanatory power and reduces measurement error.  
Using this modified Dechow and Dichev model leads to a better specified model and 
sequence of residuals.   
 The absolute value of the residuals obtained from estimating equation (2) form the 
third measure of reporting quality: FQ3, while FQ4 is the standard deviation of the 
residuals obtained from estimating equation (2) calculated over years t-4 through t. 
3.2 Determinants of Financial Reporting Quality  
The choice firms make about the quality of the financial information they report 
in their public financial statements reflects an analysis that weighs the expected benefits 
against the associated costs of disclosing high-quality information.  Given the expected 
benefits of providing information of higher quality, one would expect firms to choose to 
provide the highest quality of financial information possible, absent any costs of 
disclosing such information.  Thus, one would expect to observe a corner solution where 
the maximum reporting quality is chosen.  In reality, this does not occur, implying that 
there are costs associated with disclosure, such as direct costs (non-proprietary), litigation 
costs, and proprietary costs.  Given such costs, firms would select an interior solution to 
financial reporting quality.  Therefore, when investigating the factors that determine a 
firm’s reporting strategy decision, this trade-off has to be considered. 
In addition to these specific factors affecting firms’ financial reporting quality 
decisions, I rely on cross-sectional determinants of firms’ disclosure policies used by 
prior literature (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993, 1996], Bushee et al. [2003], Butler et al. 
[2003], and Barton and Waymire [2004]).  The above studies, among others, have 
provided evidence that disclosure decisions are associated with financing needs, the 
firm’s information environment, incentive costs, firm performance, litigation costs, and 
ownership dispersion.  Building on these identified determinants, I present below the 
empirical model and outline the measures I use for firm-specific explanatory variables 
determining the variation in financial reporting quality.  A discussion of the control 
variables used in the analysis follows. 
 In the first stage of the analysis, I estimate the following model based on the 
variables discussed below: 
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+++++++=+ LITISSUEHERFACAPITALGROWTHOWNERFQ tititititititi ,6,5,4,3,2,101, _ φφφφφφφ  
        ξφφφφφφ +++++++ +AGESIZESEGNOCMARGINLEVERAGE titititi tititi ,12,11,10,9 1,,,7 8 _        (3) 
Where: 
FQi,t+1   Financial reporting quality measure, as described in the previous section; 
OWNER t,i  Natural log of the number of shareholders of firm i in year t (in thousands; 
Compustat annual data item #100) minus natural log of the mean number 
of shareholders (in thousands) in the firm’s size decile; 
GROWTH t,i  Current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for year t  
  (Compustat annual data item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net  
  sales for year t-1; 
CAPITAL t,i   Net plant, property and equipment (Compustat annual data item #8)  
  divided by total assets (Compustat annual data item #6);7 
A_ HERF t,i  The weighted (by segment sales) average Herfindahl-Hirshman Index for  
  the industries in which firm i reports business segment sales.  The  
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as the sum of squares of market  
  shares in the industry. ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[HERF , where si is the firm’s sales and  
  S is the sum of sales for all firms in the industry (defined by the two-digit  
  SIC code), and n is the number of firms in the industry; 
ISSUEit Dummy variable equal to one if the company issued debt or equity during  
  the current fiscal year or the next two fiscal years, and zero otherwise; 
LITit  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in a “high-litigation” industry, 
   zero otherwise; 8 
LEVERAGE t,i Long-term debt (Compustat annual data item #9) plus debt in current  
  liabilities (Compustat annual data item #34) divided by firm value 
   (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item  
  #25); 
MARGIN t,i  Gross margin percentage, calculated as the year t net sales (Compustat  
 annual data item #12) less cost of goods sold for the year (Compustat   
  annual data item #41), scaled by net sales;  
OC t,i   Operating cycle for firm i at time t, measured in days as 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++ , where AR is the firm’s accounts 
receivable, INV is the firm’s inventory, and COGS is the firm’s cost of 
goods sold; 
N_SEGi,t Number of two-digit SIC code industries that the firm is engaged in year t; 
SIZE t,i  Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year 
(year t), calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number 
of shares outstanding  at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 
times Compustat annual data item #25); 
                                                 
7 When the reporting quality measure is FQ3 and FQ4, I do not include the variables CAPITAL and MARGIN as a 
determinant to avoid any mechanical association given that PPE and a variation of MARGIN is used as an explanatory 
variable in equation (2). 
8 Following Kasznik and Lev [1995] I define “high-litigation” industry as: high-technology firms (SIC codes 2833-
2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577,3600-3674).  Using the definitions in Francis et al. [1994] produces identical 
results.  
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AGE The firm’s age, natural logarithm of number of months the company has 
been listed on CRSP;  
 I estimate the model in equation (3) both across firms and time, resulting in a 
pooled cross-sectional time-series specification.9 
Firms have incentives to respond to investors’ demands for firm-specific 
information since reducing information asymmetries between the firm and its investors 
can lower their cost of capital (Healy and Palepu [2001] and Verrecchia [2001]).  
External demands for firm-specific financial information are expected to vary with the 
level of ownership concentration.  Higher potential information asymmetry, especially 
among investors, and demands for firm-specific information is expected for firms with a 
highly dispersed investor base.  Therefore, outsiders’ demands for financial information 
from these firms is expected to be higher than for firms with high levels of ownership 
holdings.  To capture the effect of ownership dispersion on the quality of financial 
reporting, I use the variable OWNER, which is the log of the number of shareholders of 
the firm adjusted by the log of the mean number of shareholders in the firm’s size decile.  
The use of this exact variable is motivated by Bushee et al. [2003] who used this 
explanatory variable as a determinant of a firm specific disclosure decision (holding an 
open versus closed conference call). 
To proxy for the proprietary costs associated with the reporting decision, I use 
measures of a firm’s capital intensity, growth opportunities, and characteristics of its 
product market.  If a product market’s barriers to entry are relatively high, the associated 
costs of disclosure should be relatively low.  High capital intensity is generally 
interpreted as a major barrier of entry (Piotroski [2003], Hou and Robinson [2005]). 
Therefore, capital intensity is thought to be positively associated with the quality of 
financial information.10  High entry costs to a market, as reflected by high capital 
requirements, create situations in which a large fraction of the capital costs are already 
sunk for incumbent firms, but are decision relevant to potential entrants.  To capture the 
feature of capital intensity as a barrier to entry, I use the variable CAPITAL, which 
                                                 
9 As an alternative specification, I have estimated also a firm-specific time series specification for firms with more than 
15 years of data.  Under this method, the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from the firm-specific regressions 
were used as a measure of reporting quality.  While this alternative estimation procedure decreased substantially the 
number of firms in the sample (1,476 firms), the results based on this alternative specification are not significantly 
different from the reported results. 
10 In examining the effects of proprietary costs on segment disclosures, Piotroski [2003] uses capital intensity as a 
proxy for barriers to entry and shows that it is positively associated with the fineness of segment reporting.  
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comprises net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets.11  Capital intensity 
proxies also for financing needs (Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]), thus, consistent with the 
literature to date, it is expected that more capital intense firms which have higher 
financing needs will provide higher quality of financial information. 
 Another measure of proprietary costs relates to the firm’s growth opportunities. 
The more innovative a market is and the more heavily it relies on intangible knowledge, 
the more a firm should invest to retain its unique status and preserve future opportunities. 
Given that these future opportunities are positively associated with proprietary costs, I 
use GROWTH, which I define as the current year’s percentage change in sales, as a 
proxy for future opportunities that the firm needs to protect.  I expect that it will be 
negatively associated with the level of future cash flow predictability.12 
The literature identifies existing competition in a firm’s product market as being 
associated with proprietary costs.  Competition thus influences a firm’s disclosure 
decisions.  In order to account for product market competition, I measure the 
concentration rate of each industry using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  I calculate the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[HERF , where si  is the firm’s sales, S is the 
sum of sales for all firms in the industry (defined by the two-digit SIC code), 
S
si  is the 
market share of firm i, and n is the number of firms in the industry.13  Since the 
concentration ratio is an industry measure, I use a weighted average degree of 
concentration (competition) the firm faces in order to capture the effect of competition of 
firms’ decision to provide a certain level of information quality.  The weighted average 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index is the sum of the industry concentration ratios for all the 
industries the firm is engaged in (i.e., specific segment data is disclosed in the annual 
report), each weighted by the ratio of specific segment sales to total sales.14  
                                                 
11 As a sensitivity analysis, I repeated the analysis by using capital expenditures, a flow variable. The reported results 
are not affected by this change. 
12 As an alternative measure, I used R&D expenses and advertising expenses.  However, for many firm-year 
observations, Compustat data item # 46 (R&D Expenses) is missing which decreased the sample by 70%.  For the 
reduced sample, I find that this variable is more strongly and significantly associated with the quality of financial 
information in the predicted direction.  In addition, none of the results of the second stage analysis are different using 
this reduced sample.   
13 One can argue that the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index is a good proxy of pre-entry competition in a particular industry. 
For example, in concentrated industries where barriers to entry are low, one can expect competition to increase within a 
short period of time. 
14 As an alternative explanatory variable, I have used the firm’s market share based on total sales (total 
assets).  The firm’s market share is defined as the firm’s total sales revenues (total assets) divided by the 
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Given different analytical models’ suggestions, I do not have a specific prediction 
about the association between the quality of financial information and the level of 
competition, as captured by the concentration ratio.  On the one hand, higher 
concentration ratios proxy for monopoly rents, but on the other hand, this may be one 
reason why the industry is highly concentrated. Thus the concentration ratio is likely to 
be a proxy for high entry costs (high barriers to entry). However, if the concentration 
ratio is a good proxy for post-entry competition (consistent with Verrecchia [1983]), then 
one would expect a positive relation between financial reporting quality and the level of 
industry concentration. Such an expectation implies a negative relation between the level 
of competition within an industry and financial reporting quality. 
To be consistent with the literature that suggests that performance is an important 
determinant of disclosures (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993]), I include the variable 
MARGIN, defined as sales revenue net of cost of goods sold, scaled by net sales.  As 
Lang and Lundholm [1993] discuss, theoretical and empirical studies provide mixed 
evidence on the relation between disclosure policies and firm performance but do not 
offer a specific prediction on the relation between the two.  It is agreed, however, that the 
two are related.  On one hand, more profitable firms with higher gross margins attract 
future competition and face higher threats of potential entrants.  Thus the higher the 
firm’s profitability, captured by its gross margin, the more the cost of providing higher 
quality of financial information is expected to be.  On the other hand, a positive relation 
between disclosure and firm performance is implied by an adverse selection argument.   
Litigation costs have been suggested by prior studies (e.g., Francis et al. [1994], 
Skinner [1994], and Lev and Kasznik [1995]) as a determining factor of financial 
reporting strategies.  I define the dummy variable LIT to take the value of 1 if the firm 
operates in a “high-litigation” risk industry.  If lower precision of accounting information 
is costly to firms, I expect that when litigation costs are higher, the quality of information 
is higher. 
The presence of agency costs gives rise to demand for monitoring, and the 
information a firm’s financial statements provide may be used to mitigate agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling [1976]).  Highly leveraged firms have higher agency costs and thus 
                                                                                                                                                 
sum of total sales revenues (total assets) of all sample firms in the same two-digit SIC code.  The results 
reported using this alternative variable are not affected and are similar.   
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a greater demand for monitoring.15 Therefore, I predict reporting quality to vary with a 
firm’s capital structure (Watts [1977], Smith and Warner [1979], Leftwich et al. [1981], 
Butler et al. [2003], and Barton and Waymire [2004]).  In a recent study, Barton and 
Waymire [2004] provide evidence that managers’ incentives to supply high quality 
financial statements increase with the level of shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts as 
proxied by the amount of leverage in the firm’s capital structure.  They show a significant 
positive association between firms’ leverage and the quality of public accounting 
information and interpret this finding as consistent with debt contracting influencing 
financial reporting.  If the financial information provided in the firm’s annual report is 
complementary to the monitoring information debt providers use, I expect more 
leveraged firms to provide financial information of higher quality.  However, if debt 
providers use substitute information channels to acquire monitoring information, this will 
decrease the likelihood that the previous prediction holds true.  Following Leftwich et al. 
[1981], I use the variable LEVERAGE, which is the firm’s total debt to firm value, to 
capture this determinant on financial reporting quality.16 
Motivated by the empirical evidence in prior research that security issuance is 
associated with disclosure policies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993]), I include the 
variable ISSUE as an additional determinant of financial reporting quality.   
Control Variables: 
Differences across firms could influence the future performance and predictability 
of their future cash flows. Dechow, Kothari and Watts [1998] show that ability of 
earnings to predict future cash flows depends on the firm’s operating cash cycle.  
Dechow and Dichev [2002] claim that longer operating cycles induce more uncertainty, 
making accruals noisier and less helpful in predicting future cash flows.  To control for 
the uncertainty associated with the operating environment of the firm, I include in 
equation (3) a proxy for the length of the operating cycle (OC), where OC = 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++  (measured in days).  The operating cycle variable captures 
variation in future cash flow predictability that is likely not predetermined.  To further 
                                                 
15 There is no consensus in the corporate finance literature whether firms that are highly leveraged have higher agency 
costs (Jensen [1986]).  It can be argued that debt holders provide additional monitoring and incentives that lower 
agency costs.  Consistent with the studies cited above, I expect a positive association between LEVERAGE and 
financial reporting quality. 
16 Capital structure is an endogenous variable for the firm as well. To address this concern, the specification of equation 
(3) uses lagged values of the explanatory variables in contrast to a contemporaneous specification. 
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address how the complexity of the firm’s operating environment affects variation in 
information quality, I also include the number of line of businesses that a firm engages in 
(N_SEG).  
Consistent with previous empirical studies, I control for the firm’s informational 
environment, by including the firm’s size.  The variable SIZE is defined as the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year.  In addition, I include the 
variable AGE, conjecturing that younger firms have a lower quality of accounting 
information. 
3.3 Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality  
I use four proxies for capital markets consequences of financial reporting quality: 
1) the firm’s cost of equity capital (using both implied cost of capital estimates and the 
Fama-French [1993] three factor model, 2) the firm’s standard deviation of stock returns, 
3) the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, estimated as the residual variance from a regression of 
stock returns on the market’s return (using the traditional market model), and 4) the 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (a proxy for uncertainty and estimation risk).  
The main hypothesis that I test is whether providing financial information of higher 
quality is associated with capital markets valuation benefits.  To do so, I estimate the 
following pooled cross-sectional time-series model: 
 εββα titiitti FQXR ,,210, '' +++=                                        (4) 
In equation (4) the dependent variable is one of the four proxies for capital 
markets consequences, Xit represents a vector of control variables, and FQi,t is an 
empirical measure of reporting quality.  As discussed previously, FQ is likely to be 
correlated with the error termε , which creates an endogeneity problem.  This 
endogeneity is generally due to omitted correlated variables.  As shown in the previous 
section, financial reporting quality may be determined by factors that are not captured by 
the control vector X.  
This endogeneity problem can be solved through an instrumental variables 
approach.  Following this approach, the researcher must identify a vector of observable 
variables that do not appear in equation (4) and are not correlated with the error termε , 
but are correlated in part with the variable FQ.  The variables identified in section 3.2 
meet this requirement.  
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I estimate a two-stage procedure (see Wooldridge [2002], chapter 5), in the first 
stage of which I estimate a financial reporting quality model.  Using the fitted values 
from the first stage model as an instrumental variable for the quality measure (IV), I 
estimate in the second stage an OLS regression of capital markets/valuation benefits 
proxies on firm characteristics and this instrumental variable.17 Following Maddala 
[1983, p. 118-121], I do not include in the first stage model [equation (3)] a variable that 
proxies for any of the capital markets benefits that I use in the second OLS regression.  
Including the dependent variable of the second stage equation in the first stage model will 
lead to a logically inconsistent specification, unless the second stage dependent variable 
coefficient is restricted to be equal to zero.18  This methodology is similar to the approach 
undertaken by Barton and Waymire [2004] who adopt an instrumental variables approach 
to control for the endogenous nature of financial reporting decisions when testing the 
capital market’s reaction to the stock crash of 1929.  
The following specific models are estimated across firms and time:       
 ϑρρρ
ρρρρρρ
++++
++++++=
titititi
tititititie
FQINDSMB
LTGDISPLEVERAGESIZEBETAR ti
,,8,7,6
,5,4,3,2,10
_
,      (4a) 
   
ζχχχχ tititititi FQMBSIZESTDRET ,,3,2,10, _ ++++=               (4b)  
πλλλλ tititititi FQMBSIZEIDIOS ,,3,2,10, _ ++++=           (4c) 
ψϖϖϖϖϖ titititititi FQANALYSTSURPSIZEDISP ,,4,3,2,10, +++++=           (4d) 
Where: 
Re t,i   Cost of equity capital for firm i, year t; 
BETA t,i  The market beta for firm i in year t, estimated using a rolling window of   
  five years of monthly returns where the CRSP value-weighted market  
  return is used as the market return; 
SIZE t,i  Natural logarithm of market capitalization for firm i, at the end of the  
  fiscal year t, calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the  
  number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data  
  item #199 times Compustat annual data item #25); 
                                                 
17 In order to derive correct inferences, the standard errors are adjusted to address the correlation between the error 
term of the first stage choice model and the error term in the second stage equation. 
18 As an alternative estimation procedure, I have estimated the probability that the quality of financial information for a 
given firm is above the industry median using a Probit model.  Using the fitted probabilities of this first stage 
estimation as an instrumental variable, I repeated the second stage analysis in which the association between this 
instrument and the capital markets benefits variables was investigated.  The results using this alternative procedure 
provide similar results to those reported in the current version of the paper.  These results are available from the author 
upon request. 
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B_Mi,t  Book-to-Market ratio, where market value of equity is calculated as the  
  closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at  
  fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual  
  data item #25), divided by the book value of common equity (Compustat  
  annual data item #60); 
LEVERAGE t,i  Long-term debt (Compustat annual data item #9) plus debt in current  
  liabilities (Compustat annual data item #34) divided by firm value 
  (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item  
  #25); 
LTGi,t    Expected long term growth in earnings, defined as the percentage change 
in the mean two-year ahead earnings forecast (obtained from IBES) from 
the current earnings realization (Compustat annual data item #58); 
STDRETit Firm i’s standard deviation of daily holding period return averaged over 
the 12 months starting as of June subsequent to fiscal year t; 
IDIOSit The residual variance from a regression of firm-specific returns on the 
returns of the CRSP value-weighted market index over the 12 months 
starting as of June subsequent to fiscal year t;  
DISP t,i  Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of year t earnings per share  
  (IBES) for firm i, measured in June following fiscal year t-1, scaled by  
  beginning of period price; 
INDSi,t  Average industry implied equity cost of capital; 
SURP t,i  Absolute value of the difference between current year’s earnings per  
  share (Compustat annual data item #58) and the previous year earnings per  
  share, scaled by average total assets of the firm; 
ANALYST t,i  Number of analysts issuing forecasts at the same time DISP was  
  calculated (IBES); 
ψπυζ titititi ,,,, ,,, Error terms assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. 
 Equation (4a) is specified similarly to the cross-sectional regression of the implied 
risk premium in Gebhardt et al. [2001, Table 7] and includes similar controls.  Using this 
particular specification makes the analysis from an asset pricing perspective more 
relevant since we can learn which of the firm characteristics are more important and 
significant determinants of the implied equity cost of capital. 
 Equations (4a-4d) are estimated using both pooled cross-sectional time-series 
regressions and Fama-MacBeth regressions.  I report the results of the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, for which I run cross-sectional regressions annually and then average the 
annual coefficients across the sample years from 1987-2003.  I use the standard deviation 
of the coefficients across the seventeen sample years to compute the t-
statistics:
n
t σ
β
β
−
= ; where 
−β  is the average coefficient based on the yearly regressions, 
σβ is the time-series standard deviation corresponding to each coefficient, and n is the 
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number of years.  Since the autocorrelation between the coefficients in the annual 
regressions can affect the true standard errors and thus inflate the t-statistics, I correct the 
t-statistics in a manner consistent with Bernard [1995]. 
Next, I discuss each one of the economic consequences models as specified in 
equations (4a-4d).   
3.4 Financial Reporting Quality and Risk 
3.4.1 Cost of Equity Capital 
Following Barone [2002] and Francis et al. [2004, 2005], lower quality financial 
reporting leads to greater uncertainty and ultimately to higher information risk.  If this 
risk cannot be diversified away, it will result in a higher cost of equity capital.   
Following this rationale, I test the association between the empirical measures of 
reporting quality outlined in section 3.2 and an implied equity cost of capital estimated 
using the models presented in Claus and Thomas [2001], Gebhardt et al. [2001], Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth [2005] as implemented in Gode and Mohanram [2003], and Easton 
[2004].  Previous studies have used different measures for the equity cost of capital.  
Since the cost of capital is not an observed phenomenon, one needs to estimate it.  Some 
of the estimation methods used in the literature are based on the Fama-French three-
factor model (Fama and French [1993]).  As Fama and French [1997] point out, equity 
cost of capital estimates based on the three-factor model are imprecise, both at the firm 
level and the industry level.  Another alternative is to proxy for the equity cost of capital 
by using realized stock returns. This approach has problems too, given that the 
correlations between expected returns and ex post realized returns are weak (Elton 
[1999]).  These approaches have led researchers to infer ex ante equity cost of capital 
rates using an implied approach. Following this approach, assuming a valuation model, 
one estimates the implicit equity cost of capital using the current stock price and 
observable proxies for market expectations of future cash flows or earnings (usually 
analysts’ earnings forecasts). 
 The specific models differ in terms of the assumptions made regarding growth 
rates, terminal values, and forecast horizons.  I summarize the specific models used in the 
Appendix.  While there is a debate about the merits of various ex ante measures (e.g., 
Gode and Mohanram [2003], Guay et al. [2003]), I take no position, but use a variety of 
accepted methods to calculate the implied equity cost of capital to ensure that the 
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documented results are robust and convincing.  Similar to Hail and Leuz [2004], I 
average the four proxies to reduce any measurement error in the equity cost of capital 
proxies and use RAVG as the dependent variable in equation (4a).  Furthermore, I have 
performed the analysis using the four individual models and obtained very similar results 
to the one I report.  In addition to the four implied equity cost of capital estimates, as a 
sensitivity test, I use a stock-return metric based on the Fama-French three factor 
model.19  All in all, due to the lack of consensus in the literature which measure is the 
best one or even whether these empirical proxies can be evaluated, I believe that using 
these varieties of procedures ensures the reader that the results documented in the study 
are robust and convincing. 
 While the main focus of the analysis is to examine the association between 
financial reporting quality and the cost of equity capital, the extant literature has 
identified a number of factors that are associated with the firm’s cost of capital.  The 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) implies that the firm’s expected returns are 
positively associated with its market beta.  I include BETA in equation (4a) to control for 
this risk factor.  A positive relation is expected between BETA and the equity cost of 
capital. 
 Given the evidence documented in the finance literature, in order to proxy for the 
firm’s total information environment, I include a measure of the firm’s size in equation 
(4a).  I use the firm’s market capitalization and expect a negative association between 
SIZE and the equity cost of capital since previous research suggests that smaller firms are 
more risky than large firms.  
 Fama and French [1992] find that, compared to lower book-to-market firms, 
higher book-to-market firms earn higher realized returns.  To control for risk factors 
associated with this measure, I include in equation (4a) B_M, the firm’s book-to-market 
ratio, and expect a positive association between this variable and the equity cost of 
capital. 
 Leverage is included as an additional explanatory variable since the firm’s risk 
increases with the firm’s financial leverage.  I expect a positive association between 
financial leverage and the equity cost of capital. 
 
                                                 
19 I provide asset-pricing tests using the Fama-French three factor model in Table 6. 
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3.4.2 Standard Deviation of Stock Returns 
 Standard deviation of stock returns is a commonly used measure of risk in the 
literature.  Stock price volatility has been identified as a proxy for uncertainty and 
information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders and among capital markets 
participants (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993]).  High levels of uncertainty and 
information asymmetries suggest higher levels of volatility, i.e., higher standard deviation 
of stock returns.  Analytical research has shown that, in addition to the release of public 
financial information, the quality of disclosures affects the levels of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry in the capital markets (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]).  To 
examine whether uncertainty is affected by the quality of public financial statements, I 
estimate equation (4b).  I measure volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock-
returns calculated over the 12 months following June of year t.  I include as control 
variables two firm characteristics which have been shown to be associated with the 
standard deviation of stock returns:  the firm’s size and the book-to-market ratio. 
3.4.3 Idiosyncratic Risk 
 The standard deviation of stock returns is a measure of total risk, which includes 
both systematic and idiosyncratic components.  Stock returns which are tied to common 
factors or market wide returns are the source of systematic risk.  Non-systematic or 
idiosyncratic risk results from innovations that are specific to a particular stock.  To 
better understand whether financial reporting risk can be characterized either as a 
systematic priced factor or as an idiosyncratic risk factor, I estimate equation (4c). I 
assume, consistent with the asset-pricing literature, that the return on every stock is 
driven by a common factor and a firm-specific componentε i .  Assuming a simple market 
model in the return generating equation one gets: 
   εβ titmiti rRrR tftf ,,, )( ,, +−=−            (5) 
where R ti, is the return on stock i, R tm, is the market return, r tf , is the risk-free rate, and 
ε ti, is the idiosyncratic return.  The CAPM implies that investors can earn the risk free 
rate by investing in a risk-free asset and )(
,, rR tftmi −β is the required risk premium for 
asset i.  Since )(
,, rR tftmi −β is common to all the assets in the economy, β i  is the only 
factor specific to asset i determining the expected rate of return and thus the required risk 
premium.  The CAPM does not account for the component σ ε2i and suggests that this 
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idiosyncratic risk does not affect risk premiums since in an economy with a large number 
of assets, it can be diversified away by holding a well-diversified portfolio.20 
 The dependent variable in equation (4c), IDIOS, is defined as the residual 
variance from a firm-specific regression of stock returns on the CRSP-value weighted 
market index over a 12 month period.  I use a value weighted market index given the 
recent empirical evidence in the finance literature on the pricing effect of idiosyncratic 
risk.  On one hand, Goyal and Santa-Clara [2003] argue that idiosyncratic risk matters 
and base their analysis on equal-weighted average stock volatility measures.  On the other 
hand, Bali et al. [2004] show that the equal weighted average stock volatility used by 
Goyal and Santa-Clara [2003] predicts future returns because of its co-movements with 
overall stock market volatility.  In addition, Bali et al. [2004] find no significant evidence 
that a value-weighted average stock volatility is related to future returns. 
3.4.4 Analysts’ Forecasts Dispersion 
 Financial statements that provide higher quality information are predicted to 
reduce investor uncertainty and lower the information risk for a specific firm. In equation 
(4d), I test the effect of reporting quality on the standard deviation of analysts’ annual 
earnings estimates for a given year. 
  The focus on analyst forecast dispersion is motivated by Barry and Brown 
[1985], who argue that this variable is an appropriate proxy for uncertainty and 
estimation risk. Firms have incentives to reduce the dispersion among analysts, and hence 
the overall dispersion in capital markets earnings expectations. Given the existing 
literature’s findings, I include variables identified as being associated with the variation 
in analysts’ forecasts dispersion: SIZE, SURP, and ANALYST. Firm size and the number 
of analysts following a firm have been found to be positively related to analyst forecast 
accuracy (negatively associated to forecast dispersion). SURP is included in equation 
(4d) to capture the difficulty in forecasting earnings.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20 I have repeated the analysis assuming the Fama-French three factor model as the relevant asset pricing 
model as an alternative to the CAPM and focused on the firm-specific idiosyncratic component under this 
specification.  The reported results and interpretations in the paper are not affected by this alternative 
method.  
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4. Data and Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample Selection 
I base my analysis on data obtained from the following sources: the 2004 
COMPUSTAT annual industrial and research files, the 2004 CRSP files, and I/B/E/S data 
for 1987-2003.  Previous studies (e.g. Collins and Hribar [2002], Dechow, Kothari, and 
Watts [1998]) document and discuss how using balance sheet accounts to derive cash 
flow from operations can lead to problems like noisy and biased estimates.  The cash 
flow from operations reported in the statement of cash flows subsequent to the Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standard No. 95 (SFAS No. 95) is likely to have less 
measurement error. I therefore use the 1987-2003 period since cash flow from operations 
(Compustat annual data item #308) calculated from the statement of cash flows only 
becomes available in 1987, following SFAS No. 95.21  
I exclude firms in SIC codes 6000-6999 (financial institutions, insurance, and real 
estate companies) since the cash flow predictability empirical model developed does not 
reflect their activities.  Next, I restrict the analysis to firms that do not have any missing 
data for the variables used in the empirical analysis, and I exclude observations with the 
most extreme one percent value of their distributions.22  I require that each firm has at 
least one year of past and future cash flow from operations. These criteria yield a primary 
sample of 18,264 firm-year observations, representing 2,857 firms.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A reports summary statistics of the reporting quality measures for 
the sample of firms.  Given that all the reporting quality metrics capture variation in 
components of accruals, it is not surprising that all the metrics have similar mean and 
median values.  The pairwise correlations in Table 2, Panel B suggest that the empirical 
measures of reporting quality are highly and significantly positively correlated.   
Consistent with findings in Gebhardt et al. [2001] that implied cost of equity 
capital estimates based on accounting valuation models are lower than estimates based on 
ex post stock returns, the estimates based on the Fama-French three factor model are 
higher than the implied based estimates.  The correlation between the equity cost of 
capital estimates are consistent with the evidence presented in Hail and Leuz [2004] and 
                                                 
21 SFAS No. 95 requires firms to present a statement of cash flows for fiscal years ending after July 15, 1988. Some 
firms early-adopted SFAS No. 95, so my sample begins in 1987. This sample selection is consistent with Barth et al. 
[2001].  
22 The results and inferences reported are not affected by eliminating the extreme values of the distribution. 
 24
Guay et al. [2003] and provide evidence that the four proxies are highly and significantly 
correlated (Table 2, Panel D).  This is not surprising since the models rely on similar 
valuation inputs and constructs.  It can be observed that since the Fama-French estimate 
is based on a very different estimation technique, its correlation with the implied 
estimates is not as high.  
An examination of the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2, Panel E suggests 
that the sample firms are large relative to the COMPUSTAT population, with mean 
(median) total assets of $1,549 million  ($238 million) and mean (median) market value 
of equity of $1,756 million ($278 million), profitable (return on assets of about 0.018), 
and growing (median sales growth of 0.068).  
The operating cycle (OC) has a mean of 138 days and a standard deviation of 77 
days.  This indicates that the majority of the firms in the sample have an operating cycle 
of less than one year.  This finding is consistent with the fact that most accruals reverse 
within one year (Dechow and Dichev [2002]). The mean (median) of A_HERF (the 
concentration ratio) is 0.28 (0.25), indicating that the sample represents rather 
competitive industries.  
4.3 Multivariate Analysis – Determinants of Financial Reporting Quality 
 As discussed in section 3, I first examine the determinants of reporting quality.  
The results of a multivariate analysis from estimating the model specified in equation (3) 
using the different quality measures are reported in Table 3. 
  I interpret the significance of OWNER as consistent with investors’ demands for 
financial information influencing the quality of this information.  This finding is 
consistent with Bushee et al. [2003] evidence that conference calls properties are affected 
by the structure of the investor base.  Firms that are more leveraged (LEVERAGE) are 
significantly more likely to provide high-quality financial information.  This is consistent 
with debt contracting and monitoring influencing the quality of financial information 
(Watts [1977]) and the empirical evidence in Barton and Waymire [2004].  The 
significant results for OWNER and LEVERAGE appear not to depend on a particular 
quality measure.  
 In addition, I find evidence that proprietary costs affect the reporting quality 
choice.  In particular, the results indicate that the overall competition the firm faces 
measured by A_HERF (the weighted Hefindahl-Hirshman Index), affects reporting 
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quality.  The coefficients of A_HERF are significantly positive, suggesting that firms in 
less competitive industries are less likely to report high-quality information.  This result 
is consistent with the findings in Harris [1998], who demonstrates that firms are less 
likely to disclose operations in less competitive industries as business segments.  In other 
words, a higher quality of information prevails in more competitive environments.  This 
result is consistent with theoretical models predicting less disclosure in less competitive 
markets (e.g., Hayes and Lundholm [1996]).  On the other hand, this result is not 
consistent with disclosure models that predict that firms respond to higher levels of 
competition by providing less information (e.g., Verrecchia [1983]).  
 CAPITAL has a significant positive effect on reporting quality, which suggests 
that more capital-intensive firms provide financial information that more precisely 
predicts future cash flows.  One explanation for this finding is that capital intensity acts 
as a barrier to entry for future competitors in the product market.  Therefore, such firms 
incur fewer costs in providing financial information which is more informative regarding 
future performance.  In addition, CAPITAL proxies for financing needs.  This suggests 
that more capital intense firms have more financing needs, inducing a higher quality of 
information.  Consistent with Lang and Lundholm [1993], I find that firms that are more 
active in issuing securities choose to provide high quality information. The variable 
ISSUE is positively associated with the quality of financial information provided.  The 
coefficient on GROWTH is significant at conventional levels, only when the dependent 
quality variable is FQ1.  
 The results indicate that the larger the firm, the higher the quality of its financial 
reporting. This finding is consistent with previous research documenting a positive 
relation between firm size and disclosure policy decisions (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 
[1993]). The significant coefficient on MARGIN (columns 1 and 2) bears out the 
hypothesis that more profitable firms (as reflected in higher realized margins) have the 
higher proprietary costs associated with lower reporting quality.  The positive coefficient 
on MARGIN is consistent with the findings in Piotroski [2003], who interprets MARGIN 
as a proxy for proprietary costs, but inconsistent with previous findings that firm 
performance is positively related to disclosure policies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 
[1993]).   
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 The litigation variable (LIT) is not significant at conventional levels, suggesting 
that it is not associated with the quality of financial information.  One explanation for this 
finding results from the nature of the quality measure which proxies for precision of 
information, rather than the specific type of information, i.e., good news versus bad news 
(see for example Skinner [1994], Kasznik and Lev [1995]).  
 The coefficient on OC is positive and significant across all the model 
specifications in Table 3, consistent with the findings in Dechow and Dichev [2002].  
This suggests that firms with higher operating cycles have lower quality of financial 
reporting.  The control variable AGE is in general not significant in explaining variation 
in quality choices.   
4.4 Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality 
 In this section, I examine the capital markets consequences associated with 
financial reporting quality policies.  First, for each one of the specifications, I estimate an 
OLS regression, treating reporting quality as exogenous.  Next, I use the instrumental 
variables from the first stage as proxies for reporting quality and repeat the analysis.  
Such an analysis examines whether information risk is associated with any of the 
economic consequences variables once the specific factors determining this information 
risk are modeled.  
4.4.1 Earnings-Price Ratios  
 Table 4 presents the results of examining whether reporting quality explains the 
variation in industry-adjusted Earnings-Price ratios.  All four columns in Table 4, Panel 
A support the assertion that E/P is negatively associated with long-term growth (LTG).23  
This relation is expected, since the E/P ratio equals the risk premium minus the growth 
rate.  The results in Table 4, Panel A suggest that firms with lower quality of financial 
reporting have larger E/P ratios, after controlling for other factors determining E/P ratios.  
This result is consistent with the results presented in Table 2 in Francis et al. [2005] and 
suggests that as the quality of information decreases, so does the amount investors are 
willing to pay for a dollar of reported earnings, implying a higher equity cost of capital 
for firms with low quality information.  However, after controlling for the firm-specific 
characteristics determining information quality (Table 4, Panel B), I find that reporting 
quality is not significantly associated with the E/P ratio. This finding suggests that lower 
                                                 
23 The particular specification tested in Table 4 is very similar to Table 2, Panel C in Francis et al. [2005].   
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financial reporting quality does not necessarily imply a higher risk-premium once the 
determinants of reporting quality are controlled for.  
4.4.2 Equity Cost of Capital 
 Table 5 presents the results of examining whether reporting quality explains the 
variation in firm-specific equity cost of capital estimates.  Replicating prior studies’ 
findings, Table 5, Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (4a), using FQ1-FQ4 
as empirical measures of reporting quality.  All four earnings quality metrics are 
significantly associated with the equity cost of capital after controlling for other factors 
associated with the equity cost of capital as identified in the accounting and finance 
literature.  These results imply that firms providing high-quality accounting information 
enjoy a lower equity cost of capital.  Based on these results, one could conclude that the 
reporting quality is an information risk factor which is systematically priced by capital 
markets participants, over and beyond additional risk factors priced by the market, such 
as beta, size, and book-to-market.  
 The results listed in Panel B of Table 5, however, suggest that this conclusion 
does not hold up when one acknowledges the firm-specific factors affecting financial 
reporting quality.  If the specification estimated in Panel A is subject to a correlated 
omitted variables problem, the estimated value of the coefficient corresponding to the 
particular treatment effect may be biased and inconsistent.  Once all these factors are 
controlled for, the reporting quality coefficients are not significant (the coefficients on the 
instrumental variables IV1-IV4 decrease and approach zero) in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in the equity cost of capital estimates over and above previously 
documented risk factors which influence the equity cost of capital.  Consistent with 
findings in the literature, I find that the equity cost of capital is associated with firm size, 
the book-to-market ratio, and financial leverage.  These results demonstrate the 
importance of accounting for the underlying factors affecting variation in financial 
reporting quality.  Failing to do so significantly affects the conclusions researchers draw 
from empirical analyses.  The discrepancy between the significant associations reported 
in Panel A and the results reported in Panel B may be due to omitted correlated firm-
characteristics affecting information risk.  Once these factors are accounted for, any 
conclusions and inferences must reflect the results reported in Panel B.   
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 In summary, the results in this section suggest that the reporting quality measures 
used in the analysis are not an additional priced risk factor over and beyond previously 
documented risk factors.   In other words, lower financial reporting quality does not 
necessarily result in a significant higher equity cost of capital, once the firm-specific 
characteristics determining reporting quality have been accounted for. 
Measurement Error in the Implied Equity Cost of Capital Estimate 
 Implied equity cost of capital estimates make use of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
of both short-term and long-term earnings.  Using analysts’ forward looking information 
might provide better estimates of the equity cost of capital than estimates obtained from 
asset pricing models (e.g., CAPM or the three-factor Fama-French models).  The use of 
analysts’ forecasts does come with a cost, however. Analysts’ earnings forecasts 
potentially have problems that might affect the precision of the equity cost of capital 
estimates.  For instance, Lys and Sohn [1990] find that analyst short-term earnings 
forecasts only contain roughly 66% of the information reflected by security prices prior 
to the forecast-release date.  If analysts do not revise their forecasts in response to recent 
stock prices changes, which proxy for changes in the overall capital market expectation 
of future earnings, using those forecasts as inputs in valuation models to estimate the 
implied cost of capital introduces systematic error into these estimates.  These errors are 
therefore correlated with recent stock price performance.  In particular, if analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are slower to reflect revisions in the capital market’s expectation than 
stock prices, then the ex ante implied equity cost of capital estimate will be too low 
(high) when recent stock returns have been high (low).24 
 Guay et al. [2003] discuss these problems in detail and report evidence that errors 
in analysts’ earnings forecasts are negatively correlated with recent stock returns.  Guay 
et al. [2003] propose two solutions that address the predictable error in the implied equity 
cost of capital estimates: use recent stock returns as a control variable, and estimate the 
implied equity cost of capital using different stock prices within a calendar year.  To 
control for the negative correlation between the implied equity cost of capital estimates 
and recent stock returns, I re-estimate equation (4a) controlling for RETURN, defined as 
                                                 
24 The intuition behind this prediction is the following: when earnings forecasts are too low, for example after recent 
positive stock returns, the implied cost of capital derived from using the current stock price and the present value of 
future earnings will be too low. 
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stock returns measured over the one year period prior to the July 1st measurement date of 
the implied equity cost of capital estimate.  
 The results (not reported) provide evidence consistent with Guay et al. [2003]’s 
findings that the implied equity cost of capital estimates are significantly negatively 
associated with recent stock returns.  However, even after controlling for recent stock 
returns, the association between the equity cost of capital estimates and reporting quality 
squares with the results reported in Table 5, suggesting that financial reporting quality is 
not significantly associated with the equity cost of capital. 
 Guay et al. [2003] also recommend a different estimation procedure for 
calculating the implied equity cost of capital, one that allows analysts more time to make 
use of recent price movements in their earnings forecasts.  This procedure estimates the 
implied equity cost of capital using the stock price as of January instead of July 1st.  
Although I use this different stock price, I still continue to use analysts’ earnings 
forecasts from June.  This alternative approach does not affect the previously documented 
results.  Controlling for the endogenous character of financial reporting quality, reporting 
quality is not significantly associated with a firm’s equity cost of capital.   
Asset-Pricing Equity Cost of Capital Estimates 
    To further address concerns regarding the validity of implied equity cost of 
capital estimates, I also estimated the equity cost of capital using the Fama and French 
[1993] three-factor model, where the size factor is defined as small minus large firm 
returns SML, the book-to-market factor is defined as high minus low book-to-market firm 
returns HML, and the market factor is defined as the excess return on the CRSP value 
weighted portfolio (Rm - Rf).  I obtain monthly time-series returns on the three factors, 
SML, HML, Rm - Rf, from Kenneth French’s website.  The loadings on the factors, b, s, 
and h, are slope coefficients estimated from the following regression model for firm i: 
HMLhSMLsRRbRRE fmfFF 0000 ][)( ++−+=            (6) 
 I re-estimate the three-factor model each year for each firm using a rolling 
window of five years of monthly returns ending in the month of June.  Firm i’s estimated 
loadings, i.e., estimated b, s, and h coefficients, multiplied by the average returns for the 
three factors provides the equity cost of capital estimate the for firm i (see Fama and 
French [1997]).   Next, I annualize this number which is an equity cost of capital proxy as 
of the month of June.  This consists of the fifth proxy for the equity cost of capital.  The 
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procedure described above is similar to the one used in Guay et al. [2003].  Next I 
estimate the following regression:25 
 ϑρρρρρ +++++= FQMBSIZEBETAR ti tititiFF ti , ,4,31,10 _,            (7) 
   As with the prior analysis, I estimate equation (7) using the standard Fama-
MacBeth [1973] methodology.  The results from estimating equation (7) are reported in 
Table 6.  Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (7) using FQ1-FQ4, while 
Panel B reports the results using the instrumental variables.  Consistent with the 
previously reported results, reporting quality does not appear to be an additional priced 
factor, once the firm-specific characteristics determining reporting quality have been 
accounted for.   
4.4.3 Reporting Quality and Risk 
 Table 7 presents the results regarding the association between reporting quality 
and the standard deviation of stock returns. The results in Table 7 indicate that higher 
reporting quality, even after controlling for reporting quality determinants leads to 
significantly lower stock returns volatility.  As discussed in section 3, the standard 
deviation of stock returns proxies for the firm’s total risk.  By examining the evidence in 
Table 8, one can distinguish between the effects of reporting quality on both the 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk components of stock return volatility.  The results in 
Table 8 suggest that once the firm-specific characteristics determining the quality of 
financial reporting quality have been accounted for, information quality is significantly 
associated with idiosyncratic risk.  This last set of results help us reconcile the evidence 
regarding the overall pricing effects of financial reporting quality.  To summarize, the 
reported results suggest that reporting quality is significantly associated with the firm’s 
total risk and the idiosyncratic component, but not with the equity cost of capital, the 
systematic component that translates into higher expected required risk premiums.  Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that, although reporting quality may proxy for uncertainty 
or information risk, this type of firm-specific information risk does not seem to be priced 
by investors, and it does not increase the firm’s equity cost of capital.  In other words, the 
firm-specific uncertainty regarding the estimation of future payoffs does not translate into 
a higher cost of equity capital. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical predictions 
                                                 
25 This particular specification was used by Easley et al. [2002, equation (7), p. 2210] in determining the effect of 
information based trading on asset returns.   
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advanced by Hughes et al. [2005] regarding the systematic and idiosyncratic pricing 
effects of information quality.     
4.4.4 Reporting Quality and Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
 As reported in Table 9, after controlling for both the determinants of analyst 
forecast dispersion and reporting quality, all the empirical measures of financial reporting 
quality display a significant association in the predicted direction with analyst forecast 
dispersion. This finding suggests that firms providing high-quality financial information 
enjoy a lower level of dispersion, which implies that investors form more precise beliefs 
about future earnings. Interpreting dispersion as a proxy for estimation risk and 
uncertainty, firms enjoy lower estimation risk by reporting accounting numbers of higher 
quality. This result is consistent with findings in Lang and Lundholm [1996] who 
document a negative association between AIMR scores as proxies for firms’ disclosure 
policies and analyst forecast dispersion. The sign and significance of the remaining 
estimated coefficients in Table 9 tally with findings documented in previous studies (e.g., 
Piotroski [2003]). 
 The evidence on the relation between analyst forecasts dispersion and financial 
reporting quality suggests that by providing high-quality financial information, a firm can 
reduce its information and estimation risk as proxied by the forecast dispersion (Barry 
and Brown [1985]).   These results are in line with the previous evidence discussed above 
on the uncertainty and firm-specific nature of reporting quality. 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants and consequences 
associated with the quality of financial reporting policies.  The evidence suggests that the 
information risk arising from the quality of financial reporting does not affect the equity 
cost of capital once the endogenous nature of this information risk has been accounted 
for.  These results suggest that reporting quality is not necessarily an additional 
systematic risk factor which investors price, but rather an idiosyncratic one.  Although 
financial reporting quality is not significantly associated with the systematic components 
of assets returns, as proxied by the equity cost of capital, it is associated with firm-
specific uncertainty and estimation precision.  These findings are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of Hughes et al. [2005] who argue that idiosyncratic risk is a 
diversifiable phenomenon and should not affect risk premiums in large economies. 
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 The results documented in this study contribute to the extant accounting literature 
in several ways.  First, the study contributes to the body of research analyzing the 
consequences of financial reporting quality policies.  In particular, the results illustrate 
the importance of explicitly modeling the specific factors determining financial reporting 
quality when investigating the associated economic consequences.  Failing to do so may 
lead to spurious inferences, as indicated by the results.  Second, this study’s findings 
show the importance of accounting not only for the benefits associated with financial 
reporting policies, but also for the constraining factors and other firm-specific 
characteristics affecting financial reporting policies. 
  
Appendix: Measuring the Implied Equity Cost of Capital 
 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth Model [2005]: ROJ 
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Assumptions: Consistent with Gode and Mohanram [2003] the short term growth rate is 
estimated using forecasted earnings for year t+1 and year t+2.   
The long-term growth is g = r f  - 3%. 
 
PEG model, Easton [2004]: RPEG 
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This represents a special case of the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model.  The model 
assumes that abnormal earnings persist in perpetuity.  To implement this model, one 
needs positive changes in forecasted future earnings. 
 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan Model [2001]: RGLS 
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This model is based on residual income valuation.  The main assumption is that ROE 
(return on equity) fades linearly to the industry median by year 12.  From year 12, the 
abnormal earnings are assumed to be constant and earned in perpetuity. 
 
Claus and Thomas [2001]: RCT 
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This model is based on residual income valuation.  It is assumed that the growth rate after 
year 5 is set equal to the inflation rate, i.e., g = r f  - 3%. 
 
 
The implied equity cost of capital is the internal rate of return that solves the valuation 
expressions.  
 
All the calculations and assumptions made are consistent with prior studies which used 
implied cost of equity measures, such as Guay et al. [2003], and Hail and Leuz [2004]. 
 
Notation: 
 
P0 = Price per share at date 0; 
dpst = Dividends per share at time t; 
epst = Forecasted Earnings per share at time t, and 
BVt  = Forecasted book value of equity per share: BVt=BVt-1+epst-dpst 
r =  Implied equity cost of capital estimate. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
FQ1 The absolute value of residuals obtained from a regression of future operating 
cash  flows on current operating cash flows and accrual components, based on 
Barth et al. [2001]. 
FQ2 Standard deviation of firm i’s residuals obtained from a regression of future 
operating cash  flows on current operating cash flows and accrual 
components based on Barth et al. [2001] calculated over years t-4 through t. 
FQ3 The absolute value of residuals obtained from a modified Dechow and Dichev 
[2002] model based on McNichols [2002]. 
FQ4 Standard deviation of the residuals obtained from a modified Dechow and 
Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 
through t. 
ROJ Equity cost of capital based on the Ohlson and Juttner-Nauroth [2005] 
approach. 
RPEG Equity cost of capital based on the PEG ratio model of Easton [2004]. 
RGLS Equity cost of capital based on Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan [2001]. 
RCT Equity cost of capital based on Claus and Thomas [2001]. 
RAVG The average of the four implied equity cost of capital estimates. 
RFF Expected return calculated using Fama and French three factor model. 
E_P RATIO Industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio. Annual earnings per share before 
discontinued operations and extraordinary items (Compustat annual item #58) 
divided by the July 1st price. 
IDIOS Idiosyncratic risk defined as the residual variance from a regression of firm 
specific stock returns on the value-weighted CRSP stock index for 12 months 
following June of year t. 
STDRET Standard deviation of daily holding period returns averaged over the 12 
months following June of year t. 
DISP Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of year t earnings per share  
(IBES) for firm i, measured in June following fiscal year t-1, scaled by  
beginning of period price; 
BETA The market beta for firm i in year t, estimated using a rolling window of five 
years of monthly returns where the CRSP weighted market return is used as the 
market return. 
CFO Cash flow from operations for firm i at year t (Compustat annual data   
item #308) minus the accrual portion of extraordinary items and  
discontinued operations per the statement of cash flows (Compustat  
annual data item #124); 
ARΔ  Change in accounts receivable account per statement of cash flows (Compustat 
annual data item #302). 
INVΔ  Change in inventory account per the statement of cash flows (Compustat 
annual data item #303). 
APΔ  Change in accounts payable and accrued liabilities account per the 
statement of cash flows (Compustat annual data item #304). 
DEPR Depreciation and Amortization Expense (Compustat annual data item #125). 
OTHER Net of all other accruals, calculated as EARN – (CFO+ΔAR+Δ INV-ΔAP-
DEPR). 
ASSETS Total assets (Compustat annual data item #6). 
 
ROA 
Return on assets, defined as EARN (Compustat annual data item #18) divided 
by total assets (Compustat annual data item #6). 
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B_M Book-to-Market ratio, where the book value of common equity (Compustat 
annual data item #60) is divided by market value of equity (calculated as the 
closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at fiscal 
year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item 
#25)). 
GROWTH Current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for year t (Compustat 
annual data item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net sales for year t-1. 
LIT A dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s SIC code is 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 
7371-7379, 3570-3577,3600-3674; zero otherwise. 
A_HERF The weighted (by segment sales) average Herfindahl-Hirshman Index for the 
industries in which firm i reports business segment sales.  The Herfindahl 
Index is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares in the industry: 
∑= =ni i SsHERF 1 2][ , where si is the firm’s sales and S is the sum of sales for all 
firms in the industry (defined by the two-digit SIC code), and n is the number 
of firms in the industry. 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt (Compustat annual data item #9) plus debt in current  
liabilities (Compustat annual data item #34) divided by firm value 
(Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item #25); 
CAPITAL Net plant, property and equipment (Compustat annual data item #8) divided by 
total assets (Compustat annual data item #6). 
OC Operating Cycle (in days), calculated as
)360/(
2/)(
)360/(
2/)( 11
COGS
INVINV
Sales
ARAR tttt −− +++ . 
N_SEG Number of two-digit SIC code industries that the firm is engaged in. 
MARGIN Gross margin percentage, calculated as the year t net sales (Compustat annual 
data item #12) less cost of goods sold for the year (Compustat annual data item 
#41), scaled by net sales. 
LTG Expected long term growth in earnings, defined as the percentage change in the 
mean two-year ahead earnings forecast (obtained from IBES) from the current 
earnings realization (Compustat annual data item #58). 
OWNER Natural log of the number of shareholders of a firm (Compustat item #100) 
minus the natural log of mean number of shareholders (in thousands) in the 
firm’s size decile. 
AGE Natural logarithm of number of months the firm has been listed on CRSP. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the total sample of 18,264 firm-year 
observations. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Financial Reporting Quality Metrics 
 MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
FQ1 0.0551 0.0362 0.064 
FQ2 0.0487 0.0341 0.052 
FQ3 0.0614 0.0484 0.058 
FQ4 0.0511 0.0389 0.067 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients among Financial Reporting Quality Metrics 
VARIABLE FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
FQ1  0.691 
(0.0001) 
0.863 
(0.0001) 
0.685 
(0.0001) 
FQ2 0.621 
(0.0001) 
 0.911 
(0.0001) 
0.632 
(0.0001) 
FQ3 0.723 
(0.0001) 
0.854 
(0.0001) 
 0.891 
(0.0001) 
FQ4 0.651 
(0.0001) 
0.691 
(0.0001) 
0.617 
(0.0001) 
 
 
FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model; FQ2 = standard deviation of 
residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model calculated over years t-4 through t; FQ3 = absolute 
value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols 
[2002]; FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] 
model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 through t; 
 
Panel B reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal line, significance levels are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Equity Cost of Capital Estimates 
 MEAN (%) MEDIAN (%) STD. DEV. (%) 
ROJ 13.1 12.7 3.68 
RPEG 11.8 10.4 3.25 
RGLS 10.9 9.7 2.98 
RCT 11.1 10.8 2.84 
RAVG 12.3 10.5 3.11 
RFF 15.4 14.2 2.18 
 
 
 
Panel D: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients among Equity Cost of Capital Estimates 
VARIABLE ROJ RPEG RGLS RCT RFF 
ROJ  0.914 
(0.0001) 
0.561 
(0.001) 
0.825 
(0.0001) 
0.181 
(0.0001) 
RPEG 0.891 
(0.0001) 
 0.524 
(0.0001) 
0.897 
(0.0001) 
0.156 
(0.0001) 
RGLS 0.523 
(0.0001) 
0.468 
(0.0001) 
 0.635 
(0.0001) 
0.114 
(0.0001) 
RCT 0.814 
(0.0001) 
0.854 
(0.0001) 
0.685 
(0.0001) 
 0.135 
(0.0001) 
RFF 0.162 
(0.0001) 
0.109 
(0.0001) 
0.125 
(0.0001) 
0.124 
(0.0001) 
 
 
Variable definitions: ROJ = Equity cost of capital based on the Ohlson and Juttner-Nauroth [2005] 
approach; RPEG = Equity cost of capital based on the PEG ratio model of Easton [2004]; RGLS = Equity cost 
of capital based on Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan [2001]; RCT = Equity cost of capital based on Claus 
and Thomas [2001; RAVG = The average of the four implied equity cost of capital estimates; RFF = Expected 
return calculated using Fama and French three factor model. 
 
Panel D reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal line, significance levels are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size = Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year (year t), calculated as the 
closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual 
data item #199 times Compustat annual data item #25); Assets = Total assets (Compustat annual data item 
#6); ROA = Return on assets, defined as EARN (Compustat annual data item #18) divided by total assets 
(Compustat annual data item #6); GROWTH = Current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for 
year t (Compustat annual data item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net sales for year t-1; A_HERF 
= The weighted (by segment sales) average Herfindahl-Hirshman Index for the industries in which firm i 
reports business segment sales.  The Herfindahl Index is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares 
in the industry: ∑= =ni i SsHERF 1 2][ , where si is the firm’s sales and S is the sum of sales for all firms in the 
industry (defined by the two-digit SIC code), and n is the number of firms in the industry. LEVERAGE = 
Long term debt (Compustat annual data item #9) plus debt in current liabilities (Compustat annual data 
item #34) divided by firm value (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item #25); 
OC = Operating Cycle (in days); N_SEG = Number of two-digit SIC code industries that the firm is 
engaged in; DISP = Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of year t earnings per share (IBES) for firm i, 
measured in June following fiscal year t-1, scaled by beginning of period price; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN STD. 
DEV. 
SIZE ($mil) 1756.82 278.37 4856.72 
ASSETS ($mil) 1549.42 238.42 3865.49 
ROA  0.018 0.038 0.167 
GROWTH 0.068 0.059 0.321 
A_HERF 0.281 0.253 0.107 
LEVERAGE 0.173 0.154 0.182 
OC (days) 138.12 126.70 76.70 
N_SEG 2.86 1.00 2.81 
DISP 0.0139 0.0062 0.032 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Firms’ Financial Reporting Quality 
 
+++++++=+ LITISSUEHERFACAPITALGROWTHOWNERFQ tititititititi ,6,5,4,3,2,101, _ φφφφφφφ  
        ξφφφφφφ +++++++ +AGESIZESEGNOCMARGINLEVERAGE titititi tititi ,12,11,10,9 1,,,7 8 _  
 
                 
VARIABLE PRED. FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
      
OWNER - -0.0092 
(-20.37) 
-0.0084 
(-12.54) 
-0.0075 
(-11.32) 
-0.0054 
(-8.54) 
GROWTH + 0.0001 
(2.15) 
0.0001 
(1.47) 
0.0000 
(0.94) 
0.0000 
(1.21) 
CAPITAL - -0.0445 
(-18.29) 
-0.0342 
(-15.68) 
  
A_HERF ? 0.0089 
(3.20) 
0.0074 
(2.99) 
0.0068 
(3.32) 
0.0054 
(3.53) 
ISSUE - -0.0021 
(-8.67) 
-0.0045 
(-5.45) 
-0.0035 
(-4.98) 
-0.0027 
(-5.21) 
LIT - -0.0001 
(-0.95) 
-0.0000 
(-0.54) 
-0.0000 
(-0.41) 
-0.0002 
(-1.02) 
LEVERAGE - -0.0051 
(-6.58) 
-0.0048 
(-7.98) 
-0.0056 
(-8.65) 
-0.0047 
(-5.21) 
MARGIN +/- 0.2631 
(30.64) 
0.1253 
(12.51) 
  
OC + 0.0001 
(5.25) 
0.0000 
(3.14) 
0.0000 
(2.98) 
0.0001 
(3.25) 
N_SEG 
 
? 0.0012 
(1.24) 
0.0001 
(0.75) 
0.0001 
(0.65) 
0.0000 
(0.24) 
SIZE - -0.0025 
(-3.84) 
 
-0.0005 
(-6.54) 
-0.0004 
(-5.68) 
-0.0002 
(-5.21) 
AGE - -0.0014 
(-1.35) 
-0.0001 
(-0.85) 
-0.0001 
(-0.74) 
-0.0001 
(-1.88) 
R2  0.38 0.45 0.48 0.49 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model; FQ2 = standard deviation of 
residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model calculated over years t-4 through t; FQ3 = absolute 
value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols 
[2002]; FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] 
model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 through t; 
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Table 4 
Association between Industry-Adjusted E/P Ratio and Reporting Quality 
 
          υδδδδδδ ττ ++ ++++++= tititititititi FQBETASIZELEVERAGELTGPE ,,5,4,,210 ,, 3_  
  
  Panel A: Industry-Adjusted E/P Ratio and Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
LTG -0.0038 
(-3.65) 
-0.0036 
(-3.54) 
-0.0039 
(-3.82) 
-0.0041 
(-3.55) 
LEVERAGE 0.0181 
(4.12) 
0.0179 
(3.92) 
0.0165 
(4.08) 
0.0173 
(4.03) 
SIZE -0.002 
(-6.56) 
-0.003 
(-6.33) 
-0.002 
(-6.82) 
-0.003 
(-6.67) 
BETA -0.0036 
(-2.14) 
-0.0033 
(-2.53) 
-0.0027 
(-2.21) 
-0.0019 
(-2.03) 
FQ1 0.0021 
(4.78) 
   
FQ2  0.0018 
(4.02) 
  
FQ3   0.0015 
(4.11) 
 
FQ4    0.0023 
(3.85) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.23 0.26 0.28 0.26 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 4 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.   
 
FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model; FQ2 = standard deviation of 
residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model calculated over years t-4 through t; FQ3 = absolute 
value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols 
[2002]; FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] 
model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 through t; 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Association between Industry-Adjusted E/P Ratio and Reporting Quality 
 
          υδδδδδδ ττ ++ ++++++= tititititititi FQBETASIZELEVERAGELTGPE ,,5,4,,210 ,, 3_  
 
Panel B: Industry-Adjusted E/P Ratio and Instrumented Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 
LTG -0.0029 
(-3.17) 
-0.0031 
(-3.21) 
-0.0033 
(-3.18) 
-0.0036 
(-3.07) 
LEVERAGE 0.0209 
(4.65) 
0.0242 
(4.19) 
0.0201 
(4.53) 
0.0195 
(4.21) 
SIZE -0.001 
(-5.12) 
-0.002 
(-5.41) 
-0.002 
(-5.04) 
-0.002 
(-5.87) 
BETA -0.0042 
(-2.76) 
-0.0052 
(-3.01) 
-0.0048 
(-2.89) 
-0.0032 
(-2.27) 
IV1 0.0011 
(1.48) 
   
IV2  0.0029 
(0.98) 
  
IV3   0.0023 
(1.21) 
 
IV4    0.0018 
(1.09) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.24 0.25 0.27 0.26 
 T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 4 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
IV1 – IV4 are instrumental variables based on FQ1 – FQ4 respectively. 
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Table 5 
Association between Equity Cost of Capital and Reporting Quality 
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Panel A: Equity Cost of Capital and Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
BETA 0.021 
(2.76) 
0.025 
(2.18) 
0.019 
(2.11) 
0.020 
(2.15) 
SIZE -0.041 
(-3.87) 
-0.039 
(-3.72) 
-0.037 
(-3.69) 
-0.040 
(-3.65) 
LEVERAGE 0.054 
(6.25) 
0.049 
(5.87) 
0.044 
(5.42) 
0.035 
(4.99) 
DISP -0.071 
(-4.85) 
-0.068 
(-4.88) 
-0.077 
(-5.01) 
-0.061 
(-4.62) 
LTG 0.54 
(3.85) 
0.48 
(3.24) 
0.44 
(4.01) 
0.51 
(4.98) 
B_M 0.85 
(6.45) 
0.75 
(6.57) 
0.81 
(7.12) 
0.76 
(6.98) 
INDS 0.51 
(9.52) 
0.48 
(8.48) 
0.45 
(8.55) 
0.39 
(7.52) 
FQ1 0.0051 
(3.08) 
   
FQ2  0.0042 
(2.98) 
  
FQ3   0.0039 
(2.78) 
 
FQ4    0.0044 
(3.68) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.45 0.52 0.51 0.48 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 5 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is RAVG = the average of the four implied equity cost of capital estimates.   
FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model; FQ2 = standard deviation of 
residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model calculated over years t-4 through t; FQ3 = absolute 
value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols 
[2002]; FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] 
model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 through t; 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
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Panel B: Equity Cost of Capital and Instrumented Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 
BETA 0.023 
(2.64) 
0.027 
(2.21) 
0.021 
(2.08) 
0.023 
(2.32) 
SIZE -0.039 
(-3.75) 
-0.036 
(-3.62) 
-0.034 
(-3.55) 
-0.036 
(-3.47) 
LEVERAGE 0.051 
(6.31) 
0.047 
(5.16) 
0.041 
(5.11) 
0.029 
(3.99) 
DISP -0.065 
(-3.96) 
-0.054 
(-3.52) 
-0.071 
(-4.67) 
-0.071 
(-4.27) 
LTG 0.58 
(4.03) 
0.51 
(3.55) 
0.42 
(4.15) 
0.48 
(4.53) 
B_M 0.81 
(6.12) 
0.72 
(6.08) 
0.83 
(6.58) 
0.71 
(6.72) 
INDS 0.53 
(9.21) 
0.47 
(8.79) 
0.44 
(9.01) 
0.42 
(8.01) 
IV1 0.021 
(0.80) 
   
IV2  0.025 
(0.98) 
  
IV3   0.020 
(0.87) 
 
IV4    0.031 
(1.01) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.45 0.52 0.51 0.48 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 5 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is RAVG = the average of the four implied equity cost of capital estimates.  IV1 – 
IV4 are instrumental variables based on FQ1 – FQ4 respectively. 
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Table 6 
Asset Pricing Tests of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Fama- 
French Three Factor Model Estimates and Reporting Quality 
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Panel A: Fama-French Cost of Equity Estimates and Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
BETA 0.018 
(1.18) 
0.022 
(0.98) 
0.020 
(1.04) 
0.024 
(1.21) 
SIZE -0.0048 
(-4.58) 
-0.051 
(-5.01) 
-0.049 
(-4.57) 
-0.038 
(-4.68) 
B_M 0.0024 
(2.90) 
0.0021 
(3.12) 
0.0019 
(2.94) 
0.0018 
(2.68) 
FQ1 0.024 
(3.97) 
   
FQ2  0.035 
(4.87) 
  
FQ3   0.039 
(4.62) 
 
FQ4    0.021 
(3.87) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 
 T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 6 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is RFF = expected return estimated using the Fama and French three factor model;   
FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model; FQ2 = standard deviation of 
residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model calculated over years t-4 through t; FQ3 = absolute 
value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols 
[2002]; FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] 
model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 through t; 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Asset Pricing Tests of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Fama- 
French Three Factor Model Estimates and Reporting Quality 
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Panel B: Fama-French Cost of Equity Estimates and Instrumented Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 
BETA 0.012 
(1.06) 
0.016 
(0.81) 
0.012 
(0.92) 
0.018 
(1.06) 
SIZE -0.0042 
(-4.16) 
-0.038 
(-4.25) 
-0.041 
(-4.27) 
-0.036 
(-4.12) 
B_M 0.0019 
(2.87) 
0.0020 
(3.07) 
0.0012 
(2.46) 
0.0016 
(2.70) 
IV1 0.019 
(0.54) 
   
IV2  0.024 
(0.81) 
  
IV3   0.021 
(0.78) 
 
IV4    0.014 
(0.66) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 6 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is RFF = expected return estimated using the Fama and French three factor model; 
IV1 – IV4 are instrumental variables based on FQ1 – FQ4 respectively. 
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Table 7 
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns and Reporting Quality 
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Panel A: Standard Deviation of Stock Returns and Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
SIZE -0.0024 
(-7.95) 
-0.0031 
(-8.49) 
-0.0018 
(-7.41) 
-0.0021 
(-8.94) 
B_M -0.0041 
(-3.43) 
-0.0084 
(-2.99) 
-0.0054 
(-3.55) 
-0.0079 
(-3.14) 
FQ1 0.018 
(4.17) 
   
FQ2  0.024 
(3.74) 
  
FQ3   0.015 
(3.15) 
 
FQ4    0.021 
(2.99) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 7 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of daily holding period returns averaged over the 12 
months starting as of June subsequent to fiscal year t;  FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using 
Barth et al. [2001] model;  FQ2 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model 
calculated over years t-4 through t;  FQ3 = absolute value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow 
and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols [2002];  FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated 
using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 
through t; 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns and Reporting Quality 
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Panel B: Standard Deviation of Stock Returns and Instrumented Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 
SIZE -0.0017 
(-7.41) 
-0.0024 
(-7.25) 
-0.0012 
(-6.57) 
-0.0015 
(-7.05) 
B_M -0.0031 
(-3.25) 
-0.0054 
(-2.45) 
-0.0024 
(-2.98) 
-0.0043 
(-2.76) 
IV1 0.015 
(3.54) 
   
IV2  0.019 
(3.28) 
  
IV3   0.012 
(3.07) 
 
IV4    0.016 
(2.92) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 7 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of daily holding period returns averaged over the 12 
months starting as of June subsequent to year t; 
IV1 – IV4 are instrumental variables based on FQ1 – FQ4 respectively. 
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Table 8 
Idiosyncratic Risk and Reporting Quality 
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Panel A: Idiosyncratic Risk and Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
SIZE -0.0025 
(-12.81) 
-0.0031 
(-11.69) 
-0.0038 
(-14.51) 
-0.0041 
(-12.51) 
B_M -0.0011 
(-7.31) 
-0.0015 
(-5.68) 
-0.0012 
(-4.98) 
-0.0014 
(-4.66) 
FQ1 0.0355 
(11.59) 
   
FQ2  0.0447 
(10.89) 
  
FQ3   0.0551 
(9.98) 
 
FQ4    0.054 
(11.05) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 8 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is the residual variance from a regression of firm specific stock returns on the 
value-weighted CRSP stock index for 12 months following June subsequent to year t;   
FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model; FQ2 = standard deviation of 
residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model calculated over years t-4 through t; FQ3 = absolute 
value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols 
[2002]; FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] 
model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 through t; 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Idiosyncratic Risk and Reporting Quality 
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Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk and Instrumented Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 
SIZE -0.0038 
(-10.87) 
-0.0041 
(-9.87) 
-0.0024 
(-12.45) 
-0.0031 
(-11.89) 
B_M -0.0018 
(-6.54) 
-0.0021 
(-5.03) 
-0.0019 
(-5.14) 
-0.0012 
(-4.75) 
IV1 0.0381 
(10.73) 
   
IV2  0.0474 
(9.87) 
  
IV3   0.0664 
(10.98) 
 
IV4    0.059 
(10.74) 
Mean Adj. 
R2 
0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 
 T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 8 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is the residual variance from a regression of firm specific stock returns on the 
value-weighted CRSP stock index for 12 months following June subsequent to year t; 
 
 IV1 – IV4 are instrumental variables based on FQ1 – FQ4 respectively. 
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Table 9 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Financial Reporting Quality 
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Panel A: Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 
SIZE -0.0007 
(-8.87) 
-0.0007 
(-9.27) 
-0.0006 
(-6.76) 
-0.0004 
(-7.25) 
SURP 0.0279 
(3.19) 
0.0281 
(3.29) 
0.0342 
(3.95) 
0.0327 
(3.49) 
ANALYST -0.003 
(-4.98) 
-0.003 
(-4.57) 
-0.0023 
(-4.10) 
-0.0028 
(-3.75) 
FQ1 0.0429 
(4.33) 
   
FQ2  0.0547 
(3.78) 
  
FQ3   0.0857 
(2.99) 
 
FQ4    0.0914 
(3.08) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 9 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of year t earnings per share  
(I/B/E/S) for firm i, measured in June following fiscal year t-1, scaled by beginning of period price; 
FQ1 = absolute value of residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model; FQ2 = standard deviation of 
residuals estimated using Barth et al. [2001] model calculated over years t-4 through t; FQ3 = absolute 
value of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] model based on McNichols 
[2002]; FQ4 = standard deviation of residuals estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev [2002] 
model based on McNichols [2002] calculated over years t-4 through t; 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Financial Reporting Quality 
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Panel B: Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Instrumented Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 
SIZE -0.0006 
(-8.12) 
-0.0006 
(-8.87) 
-0.0005 
(-6.74) 
-0.0005 
(-7.04) 
SURP 0.0283 
(3.23) 
0.0285 
(3.74) 
0.0354 
(3.82) 
0.0318 
(3.24) 
ANALYST -0.003 
(-4.25) 
-0.003 
(-4.11) 
-0.0019 
(-3.87) 
-0.0022 
(-3.14) 
IV1 0.0521 
(3.84) 
   
IV2  0.0617 
(4.06) 
  
IV3   0.114 
(3.15) 
 
IV4    0124 
(4.05) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 9 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from 
yearly OLS regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of year t earnings per share  
(I/B/E/S) for firm i, measured in June following fiscal year t-1, scaled by beginning of period price; 
 
IV1 – IV4 are instrumental variables based on FQ1 – FQ4 respectively. 
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